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Abstract
This paper studies the constructive nature of social welfare orders on infinite utility

streams defined on X=YN , satisfying the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle (PD), which are
known to be representable (see Alcantud (2010) and Sakamoto (2012)). We describe the
restrictions on domain Y for explicit representation or construction of the social welfare orders

satisfying (i) PD and monotonicity; or (ii) PD only. We show that the restrictions on Y for
either (a) construction; or (b) explicit representation of the social welfare orders are identical in
both cases.

Keywords: construction, correspondence principle, non-Ramsey set, Pigou-Dalton transfer
principle, representation, social welfare orders

JEL Classification Codes : D60, D70, D90

I. Introduction

In this paper, we consider the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle (written hereafter as
which shows preference for a non-leaky and non-rank switching redistribution of a good

rich person to a poor with no-one else being affected. The redistribution is non-leak
sense that the gain to the poor person is exactly equal to the loss suffered by the rich p
and non-rank switching in the sense that the poor does not end up having more than th
The redistribution is inequality reducing as was initially hinted at by Pigou (1912,
"The Principle of Transfers" and recognized by Dalton (1920, p. 351), as "If there are onl
income-receivers and a transfer of income takes place from the richer to the poorer, in
is diminished.". In the literature on intergenerational equity , this scheme of re-distrib

* I thank Professor Naohito Abe, Associate Editor, and two anonymous referees of this journal for several

and suggestions which have improved the current version of the paper significantly. Also, I sincerely thank
Tapan Mitra for several helpful discussions on this subject over past several years.
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known as an illustration of consequentialist eq
inequality in the sense that any index of inequal
income as reducing the measure of inequality. Phil
as a principle of distributive justice (see Adler (201
We focus on the social welfare order (SWO), a co
the set X of infinite utility streams, where X take
empty sub-set of real numbers R, and N being the
on the representation of SWO satisfying PD with f
Dasgupta et al. (1973). Dasgupta et al. (1973, Lem
representation theorem, which is based on the the
al. (1952). In recent literature, PD has been applied
many agents (or equivalently to the infinite utility
defining the version of PD in the infinite horizon
(2008, p. 183), and Bossert et al. (2007, p. 591), who

In the general infinite utility setting, PD involve

y) in which all generations except two have the

Regarding the two remaining generations (say, i an
off in utility stream x, and the other generation (
setting up a conflict. If for both utility streams, ge

i (so that we have yj>xj>x¡>y) and x can be obtai
generation j to generation i (so that yj- xj=x¡- y¡),

We take a brief detour to describe results

(anonymity) and efficiency. In a seminal paper,
exist any SWO satisfying anonymity (who defin

(present and future)), Strong Pareto and continuity
to infer that there is no social welfare function (S
anonymity, Strong Pareto, and sup-metric continu
by showing that the impossibility persists even wh

(1980) showed that it is possible to escape the ne

metric continuity and representability conditions.
anonymity and Strong Pareto axioms. However,
the variant of Szpilrajn's Lemma given in Arrow (1

Fleurbaey and Michel (2003) explored the nec
techniques and conjectured that it may not be p

conjecture, if found to be true, could have importa
be of limited practical use in policy making. The co

its significance in applications. Lauwers (2010) a
proved the necessity of reliance on some non-co
result, thereby confirming the conjecture. Lauw
Ramsey sets to establish the non-constructive
technique devised in Lauwers (2010), further ref
and characterized the domain Y , for which the

holds. It led to a correspondence principle that if t
and anonymity axioms, then there is no SWO, sati
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which can be constructed.

This set of results relating to procedural equity inspired similar analysis in the case of
consequentialist equity conditions. In the literature on consequentialist equity, there are several
instances of the existence of equitable and efficient SWOs which are not representable. If the
SWO is shown to exist using some form of the Axiom of Choice (written hereafter as AC), then

it remains an open question if the SWO admits explicit construction. An affirmative answer
would enable the social planner to at least be able to do the pair wise ranking of infinite utility

streams and would be useful to the policy makers. In this paper, we pursue this line of
investigation in the case of PD.

It is well known that SWO satisfying PD exists (Bossert et al. (2007, Theorem 1)).
However, this existence result is derived by using the variant of Szpilrajn s Lemma given in
Arrow (1951), which is a non-constructive device. Dubey and Mitra (2014b, Proposition 2),
show that for 7=[0,l], the existence of SWO satisfying PD implies the existence of a nonRamsey set, which is a non-constructive object. It implies that a SWO satisfying PD cannot be
constructed over infinite utility streams when the domain set is y=[0,l].

In two recent contributions, Alcantud (2010, Proposition 5) and Sakamoto (2012,
Proposition 3) have proved the existence of a representable SWO satisfying PD, when the
domain set is 7=[0,l]. The techniques used by them are similar to that introduced by Basu and

Mitra (2007, Proposition 1), who show the existence of a representable SWO satisfying the
anonymity and an efficiency principle known as weak dominance. However, this existence
result uses AC and therefore the representation could potentially be non-constructive.

The possibility of representable SWOs satisfying PD allows us to enrich the research
question posed earlier. If the representation admits explicit description, then the SWO itself
becomes constructive. A positive answer would demonstrate that the use of AC in the existence

proof of equitable SWO is not essential. Negative outcome would on the other hand lead to a
version of correspondence principle, i.e., the domains for which a representable SWO satisfying

PD admits explicit description is the same as the domains for which the representable SWO
satisfying PD is constructive.

Alcantud (2012, Proposition 1) and Sakamoto (2012, Proposition 5) have shown that there

does not exist a SWF satisfying PD and Weak Pareto axiom for }O[0,l]. Therefore, we
combine the weaker efficiency condition of monotonicity with the PD first, and characterize the
subsets of y=[0,l] for which the SWOs are constructive. In the first set of results (Propositions

1-6), we show that the subsets Y for which the monotone SWOs satisfying PD are (i)
constructive; or (ii) have a representation, coincide. This leads to a correspondence principle
(Theorem 1) in line with similar results in relation to other procedural (Dubey (2011)) as well
as consequentialist (Dubey and Mitra (2014a), Dubey and Mitra (2014b), and Dubey (2016))
equity notions.1

Even though monotonicity is a very weak efficiency axiom, it turns out to be strong
enough to rule out the existence of representable SWOs for Y containing more than five distinct
elements. We therefore explore the possibility of explicit representation of SWOs satisfying PD

without insisting on monotonicity. It would bring out the conflict between the equity and
explicit representation. Results are reported in Propositions 7-10. We show that the domain
1 Similar correspondence principle holds for representation and construction of SWOs satisfying Strong Pareto which,
in addition, do not display any impatience, see Banerjee and Dubey (2014, Theorem 2).
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restrictions, for the SWOs satisfying PD (i) to

representation, coincide. This leads to a variation of

Rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec
concepts needed in the paper. In Section III, we
Section IV deals with SWOs satisfying PD with

Section V and the Appendix A contains all the proo

II. Preliminaries
1. Notation

Let IR and N be the sets of real numbers and natural numbers respectivel
y,z €= RN, we write y>z if yn>z„ , for all «€= N; we write y>z if y^z and y=£
write y^>z if yn>zn for all «€= N.
2. Definitions

Let Y, a non-empty subset of R, be the set of all possible utilities that any generation ca

achieve. Then X=YN is the set of all possible utility streams. If x €= X , then x= (xi, x2,

where, for all xn^Y. We consider binary relations on X , denoted by with symme
and asymmetric parts denoted by and > respectively, defined in the usual way. A soc
welfare order (SWO) is a complete and transitive binary relation. A social welfare func
(SWF) is a mapping W: X->R. Given a SWO ^ on Xf we say that ^ can be represented b

real-valued function if there is a mapping W: X-> >R such that for all x, y^X, we have x Ž y
and only if W(x ) > W(y).

1) Equity and Efficiency Axioms

The following consequentialist equity and efficiency axioms on social welfare orders
used in this paper.

Definition. Pigou-Dalton transfer principle (PD): If jc, y^X, and there exist i, j€=N, such
yj>Xj>Xi>y¡, and y j+ y i=Xj-'- Xi while yk=Xk for all Â:€=N'{/, j}9 then x>y.

Definition. Monotonicity (M): If x, y^X, with x>y, then x Ž y .
2) Ramsey and Non-Ramsey Collections of Sets

Let T be an infinite subset of N. We denote by Í2( T) the collection of all infinite subsets
r, and we denote £2(N) by £2. Thus, for any infinite subset T of N, we have TCI N, and T^Q.

A collection of sets TCñ is called Ramsey if there exists T£=Q such that either £2(7) CT
£2(j)c£2'r. Next we define collection of sets known as non-Ramsey.

Definition. Non-Ramsey Sets: A collection of sets TCfì is non-Ramsey if for every 7^ £
the collection £2(7) intersects both T and its complement £2'r.

3) Constructive Statements and Objects
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Next we define statements and objects which are constructive. Consider the statement of
the following form "There exists a SWO satisfying a given property.". This statement asserts

the existence of an object (SWO, in this case) satisfying the given property. We call such
statement to be constructive if it can be established in every model of Zermelo-Fraenkel (ZF)

set theory, i.e., with AC (ZFC set theory); as well as without AC (ZF set theory). In this
situation, we say that the object is constructive and that the object can be constructed.
However, if the statement (i) can be established in every model of ZFC set theory, but (ii)

there is some model of ZF set theory (without AC) in which it cannot be established, we will
say that the statement is non-constructive. Further, we will also say that the object is nonconstructive, and that the object cannot be constructed.

For illustration, consider the statement, "There exists a non-Ramsey collection of sets
TCO.". This statement has been established under ZFC set theory in Erdós and Rado (1952).
However, Mathias (1977) has shown that in Solovay's model mi (which satisfies ZF, but does
not satisfy AC) every collection of sets TC£2 is Ramsey. Therefore, there is a model of ZF set
theory in which the statement cannot be proved. Applying our definition, this statement is non-

constructive. In addition, we say that the object "a non-Ramsey collection of sets" is a nonconstructive object, and this object cannot be constructed.

We refer the reader to Dubey and Mitra (2014b, Section 2.2.5) for a detailed discussion
drawn from the mathematics literature on the interpretation of "non-constructive statements and
objects", which is relevant for this paper.

III. Monotone SWF Satisfying PD
Dubey and Mitra (2014a) have shown that SWF combining Strong Equity2 with
Monotonicity exists for Y containing not more than five distinct elements. Observe that for any

pair of sequences x and y, comparing sequences using PD is a more restrictive exercise
compared to using SE. Among all possible SE comparisons, only non-leaky transfers qualify
for comparison using PD. Further non-rank switching condition is consistent with the possibility

of the utilities of the rich and poor being equal post transfer. We continue with the domain
Y= {a, b , c, d , eì with a<b<c<d<e containing five (possibly distinct) elements. Observe that
in order to perform any PD comparison, we need at least three distinct elements in Y . Also,
elements in Y could be inconsistent for comparing utility streams using PD. In such case
W: X-1 >R as W(x) = 0 satisfies M and PD trivially.

(1) Y contains three distinct elements. Following proposition shows existence of a SWF
satisfying PD and M.

Proposition 1. If Y={a , b , c) is such that a + c=2b , then, there exists a SWF on X=YN
satisfying PD and M which is defined without using AC.

(2) Y contains four distinct elements. Let a+d=b + c and 2b=a + c (take a - 0, b= 1, c= 2
and d- 3). Following propositions deal with SWF and SWO in this case.
2 Strong Equity (SE) is defined as follows. "If x, y^X, and there exist i, N, such that yj>xj>x¡>yi while yk=xk
for all £€=N'{/, j), then x>y" It is a strong form of the Equity axiom of Hammond (1976) and was introduced by
d'Aspremont and Gevers (1977) who referred to it as an Extremist Equity Axiom.
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Proposition 2. [Alcantud (2013, Theorem I, fo

a+d=b-'-c and 2 b=a+c, then, there does n
satisfying PD and M.

Proposition 3. IfY={a, b , c , d} is such that a
of a SWO on X=YN, satisfying PD and M, ent
TCÍ2, which is non-Ramsey.
(3) Y contains five distinct elements, i.e. Y={a , b ,

(a) Let b+e=c+d and either (i) 2b = a -he, or

PD comparisons are possible for any pair of uti

(A) the pre-transfer rich and poor generation t
post-transfer rich and poor generation to have
(B) the pre-transfer rich to have utility c, or d

and the pre-transfer poor to have utility a

generation to have utility b and b respectively

In each of these cases, we can show following
that no SWF satisfying PD and M exists. For
2 b=a~'~d.

Proposition 4. If Y={a, b , c, d , ej is such that b~'~e=c+d , and 2 b=a-'~d, then, there
does not exist a representable SWO on X= YN, satisfying PD and M.
Following the approach in case (2), we show that the correspondence principle holds in
this situation as well.

Proposition 5. If Y= {a, b , c, d, ei is such that b+e=c+d , and 2 b=a+d, then, the
existence of a SWO on X=YN satisfying PD and M, entails the existence of a collection
of sets rcQ, which is non-Ramsey.
(b) (i) Let b + e=c+d , with either 2c=a+d or 2c=a + e. (take for instance a - 0, b- 4,
c= 6, d= 12, and e=14; or a = 0, b= 4, c=7, d= 11, and e='4). The utility
streams can be compared using PD, with
(A) the pre-transfer rich and poor generation to have utility e and b respectively

and the post-transfer rich and poor generation to have utility d and c
respectively;
(B) the pre-transfer rich to have utility d ox e and pre-transfer poor to have utility a

and the post-transfer rich and poor generation to have utility c and c
respectively;
3 As in case (2), we exclude the case where Y contains an element which is not included in any PD transfer with the
remaining four elements playing a role in a PD transfer (for example K={0, 1, 2, 3, 10}) where e='0 is not included

in any PD comparison). We also exclude the following possibilities: (i) {a, b, c, d}^Y such that a+*/=ò + c, and
2 b = a + c; (ii) {a, b , c, e}£=Y such that a + e=b + c , and 2 b=a + c' (iii) { a , b , d, e}^Y such that a+e=b+d, and
2b=a+d; (iv) { a , c, d , e}^Y such that a + e=c+ć/, and 2 c=a+d; and (v) {b, c, d, e}^Y such that b + e=c+d, and
2 c = b+d, as these are already covered by negative result in Proposition 3.

4 Take for instance (i) a = 0, b= 4, c = 8, d- 10, and e=14; (ii) a = 0, b = 3, c= 4, d= 6, and e - 1; and (iii) a - 0,
b = 5, c = 7, d- 8, and e- 10 for the three cases.
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(C) in case of 2c=a + e, the pre-transfer rich and poor generation to have utility d
and a respectively and the post-transfer rich and poor generation to have utility
c and 6 respectively.

(ii) Let a + e=c+d , with either 2 c=b+d or 2d=b+e. (take for instance a = 0, 6=4,
c= 5, d= 6, and e=ll; or <3 = 0, 6=1, c= 5, d= 6, and e=ll). Following PD
comparisons are possible for any pair of utility streams, with

(A) the pre-transfer rich and poor generation to have utility e and a respectively

and the post-transfer rich and poor generation to have utility d and c
respectively;

(B) in case of 2 c=b+d, the pre-transfer rich to have utility d and pre-transfer
poor to have utility 6 and the post-transfer rich and poor generation to have
utility c and c respectively;
(C) in case of 2 d-b + e, the pre-transfer rich to have utility e and pre-transfer poor
to have utility 6 and the post-transfer rich and poor generation to have utility d
and d respectively;
(D) in case of 2 d=b+e, the pre-transfer rich and poor generation to have utility d
and a respectively and the post-transfer rich and poor generation to have utility
c and 6 respectively.

(iii) Let a + e=6 + ¿/=2c, c+d^b+e and 2 d=f=c+e (take a = 0, 6=1, c- 3, d= 5, and
e =6). Following PD comparisons are possible for any pair of utility streams, with
(A) the pre-transfer rich and poor generation to have utility e and a respectively

and the post-transfer rich and poor generation to have utility d and 6
respectively;

(B) the pre-transfer rich and poor generation to have utility d and 6 respectively

and the post-transfer rich and poor generation to have utility c and c
respectively;

(C) the pre-transfer rich and poor generation to have utility e and a respectively

and the post-transfer rich and poor generation to have utility c and c
respectively.
None of the utility levels 6, c, and d can be assigned to both pre-transfer poor and
post transfer rich generations.

In each of the cases (i), (ii) and (iii), we can show that the SWF in Dubey and Mitra
(2014a, Proposition 1) satisfies PD and M (as well as WP).

(c) Let Y be such that ( a , c) < (6, 6) and (c, e) < ( d , d) be the only two possible PD
comparisons (i. e., 2 6=a+c, and 2 d=c+e are such that no other PD comparison is
feasible (take a = 0, 6=1, c=2, d= 5, and e=S). Next proposition shows that there
exists a SWF satisfying PD and M.
Proposition 6. If Y= { a , 6, c, d , e } is such that (a, c) < (6, 6) and (c, e ) < ( d , d) are the

only feasible PD comparisons, then, there exists a SWF on X=YN satisfying PD and M
which is defined without using AC.

The Propositions 1-6 exhaust all possible yCR for which representation or explicit
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construction of SWO is possible. For remaining Y n
nor the SWO is constructive. Thus we are led to fol

Theorem 1. If SWO ^ on X satisfies PD and M, th
only if it is constructive.

IV. SWO Satisfying PD

In this section we consider SWOs over infinite ut

(see Alcantud (2010) and Sakamoto (2012)) that SW
the domain set Y is the interval [0, l]. However,

Mitra (2014b) it has been shown that there is no SW

when Y=[ 0, l].
We take the subsets of E as our object of inves
sets Y for which the SWFs can be described wit

restrictive effect of the weak inequality in the pos

the cardinality of domain set Y with regard to t

show that for Y containing a minimal set of four d
explicit formula of a SWF satisfying PD exists.

Proposition 7. I fY={a, b , c, d } is such that a+c=

on X=Yn satisfying PD which is defined without us

Next we show that for any Y consisting of five d
SWO satisfying Pigou-Dalton transfer principle must

Proposition 8. If Y={a , b , c, d, ei is such that

existence of a SWO on X=YN satisfying PD, entails t
which is non-Ramsey.

By Proposition 8 we have also been able to show t

by Alcantud (2010, Proposition 5) and Sakamoto

property of explicit description. If it did, then it wo
case as " x ^ y if and only if W{x)>W{yY contradicti
It is important to emphasize the role played by t

8. For an appropriately chosen set Y consisting o
satisfying PD.

Proposition 9. If Y={a , b , c, d , e, fi is such that a+d=b+c , ó+e=c+ć/, and c+f=d+e
and neither b nor e is the post transfer utility level of rich or poor, then, there exists a SWF on

X= yN satisfying PD which is defined without using AC.

Mitra (2010) presents an example of a SWF satisfying SE for the domain Y containing
seven distinct elements. It can be used to demonstrate that it is possible to describe explicitly a
SWF satisfying PD for an appropriately chosen set Y consisting of seven distinct elements (for

example, Y consisting of seven elements, {a, b9 c, d, e,f g} with a= 1, b- 2, c= 6, d=l ,
e=ll,/=12 and g=16). Observe that the SWFs in Proposition 9 as well as in the seven
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element case violate M. However in Dubey and Mitra (2014b, Proposition 2), it has been
shown that for Y with eight or more distinct elements, every SWO satisfying PD is necessarily
non-constructive.

Proposition 10. [Dubey and Mitra (2014b, Proposition 2) ] If Y={a , b , c, d , e,f g , h} is such

that a+h = b+g , c+f=d+e , a+d=b+c, eJch=f+g , then, the existence of a SWO on
X= Yn satisfying PD, entails the existence of a collection of sets which is non-Ramsey.
As in the case of Proposition 8, the Proposition 10 also entails that the SWF satisfying PD

(which exists in this case, see Alcantud (2010, Proposition 5) and Sakamoto (2012, Proposition
3)) must be non-constructive. Thus we have covered all possible cardinality of set Y. For sets Y

containing up to seven appropriately chosen distinct elements, there exists an explicitly
constructed SWF (and SWO). For remaining Y neither any SWF satisfying PD has explicit
description nor the SWO is constructive. The Propositions 7-10 lead to following theorem for
SWO satisfying PD.

Theorem 2. If SWO ^ on X satisfies PD, then the SWO admits a representation without using
AC if and only if it is constructive.

V. Conclusions

In this paper we have established the following version of correspondence princip

domains Y , for which the SWO satisfying PD (with or without M) admits (a)
representation; or (b) is constructive, are identical. The cardinality of set Y is fi

case. We present explicit functional forms of the social welfare functions when they
second result pertains to restrictions of domain set Y for explicit representation and co
of social welfare orders satisfying PD. It explains the non-constructive nature of the
result in Alcantud (2010, Proposition 5) and Sakamoto (2012, Proposition 3).

Our paper has devised a convenient mechanism to examine the possibility
description of SWF satisfying PD. If the SWO satisfying PD is non-constructive
representation (the SWF) is also non- constructive.

We note that PD is a more restrictive equity condition compared to the Stro
axiom as PD requires transfers to be non-leaky and allows the post transfer rich
have equal utility level. In section IV, we have examined PD without imposing any
axiom. It is important to note that not all utility transfer satisfying SE would be com
PD.5
Although the set Y is finite in case the SWO is constructive, the cardinality of the set of

utility streams which could be pairwise ranked is uncountable. For the population divided
among rich, upper middle class, lower middle class, and poor (or ultra-rich, rich, median and
poor on the basis of income), SWO satisfying PD could be useful tool for policy makers.
To further expand the cardinality of set Y admitting explicit representation of SWOs, we

might consider weakening of PD. A weaker version of PD could be no regressive transfer
principle which retains the strict ranking as obtained in PD but modifies the non-leaky transfer
5 Consider Jt = { 10, 1, 0, 0, - } and >> = {9, 8, 0, 0,**-}. Then by SE but x and y are not comparable by PD.
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condition to include the situations where the sum o
pre- transfer levels. Another version is the weak Pi
ranking in PD by weak ranking. We keep these two
Appendix A Proofs

Proof of Proposition 1. For x^X, let, N(x) = {n: x„=a }, a(n)=-^9 and ô(n)=- a(n
define W: X-^ as follows:

2 a(n) if Nix) is non-empty,

n^N(.x)

W(x)
=
„
(1)
y,8(f?)Cc„~a)
■n=

Brief

intuition

individuals

is

a

sum

N

of

ignores

all

satisfies

PD,

for

every

PD.

It

is

ot

1

into

for

show

poor

discounted

non-poor
note

that

{xi=

util

indivi
the

improvement

ut

of

t

easy

to

verify

th

WU)>0>W(y).

(ii

)My)=<Z>.

/7=1

□

Remark 1. This SWF also satisfies PD and M in case Y contains four ( a+d=b+c , and 2 b^a+c,
consider a= 0, b='9 c=3, and d= 4, where pre-transfer poor can be at utility level a only) or five (where

b and c are never pre-transfer poor, consider a- 0, b= 1, c= 3, d= 4 and e=S with only two PD
redistributions, i. e., (0, 4)<(l, 3) and (0, 8) <(4, 4).) distinct elements.

Proof of Proposition 3. Let N={n', n2, ni, n4,'"} be an infinite subset of N such that au<«*+i for all
N. Let N={ 1, 2,"m, 2(/i4 - l)} . For any T^Q{Ń), T={t' , t2t /3, t*,-'} with tk<tk+i for all k^ N, we

partition the set of natural numbers N in t/={2/i - 1, 2(/2 - l), 2/3 - 1,***, 2(/4 - l),-**} and

L=N'U= {1, 2,-, 2(/i-l), 2/2-1, 2/2,- , 2(ř3-l),- } . Let LTE={t^Lf)N: t is even} and LW=

LnŇ'LŤĚ. Also, JjīĒ={t^UC'N' t is even}, ŪĪ0=UnJAŪTĒ, LCÑ=L'Ñ, and UCN=l j'Ñ . We
define the utility stream x(T , N) whose components are,

b if /eZro, d if /eZre,
x,=-c if t^ūm, c if t^ŪTĒ, (2)
.a if /eZČTV, b if t^UCN.
We also define the sequence y(T , Ń) using the subset A(/i} in place of subset T, in the following
/N.

fashion. The two partitions of the set of natural numbers N are U= {2i2 - 1 , 2(/3- l), 2ř4 - 1,

2(/5- I),"") and £=N'i/. Let LTE={t^LP'N-. t is even} and LTO=Lr'N'LTE. Also, UT
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{t^UCiÑt is even}, Um=UnÑ'UTE , LCN=L'Ñ , and UCN=U' Ñ. We define the utility stream
^(r, M whose components are,6

b if t^LTO, d if /eZre,

c if t^UTO, c if t^XjTE, (3)
a if t^LCN, b if t&JCN.
As N is unique for any N, x(S , Ń) and y(S , M are well-defined for any SéEQÍAO.

Let ^ be a social welfare order satisfying M and PD. We claim that the colle

r = Q : j^(aO jc(aO} is non-Ramsey. We need to show that for each the co

intersects both F and ß'r. For this, it is sufficient to show that for each T^Q, there exist

that either or with the either/or being exclusive. Let T={t i, /z,"'}. In the remainin

are concerned with infinite utility sequences jc(T, 7), y(ī , Ť) and x(S , 7), >>(S, Ť) where S

of notation, we omit reference to T. As the binary relation is complete, one of the follo

arise: (a) y(l)>x{l); (b) x(T)>y(J ); (c) x(f)^y(7). Accordingly, we now separate our analy
cases.

(a) Let y(l)>x(l ), i.e., . We drop *1 from T to obtain S={*2,

T' = {2t' - I, 2ii + l, •••, 2*2 3} and 7% = {2*i, 2/i +2,--*, 2*2 - 2}. Observe t

(A) for all /GN, x,(S)=yi(7);
(B) for all /E71,, Xl(i) = c>b=yl(S); for all *^7%, x,(7) = c<d=y,(S); and
(C) for all the remaining *€E N, x,(l)=yt(S).

Then for the generations 2t' - 1 and 2*i, y2i]-'{Ś)=zb<c=X2n-Al)^

y2l]-'(Ś)+y2ti(S)=X2ti-i(7)+x2li(7) or b+d=2c. Similar inequalities hold fo

{2*i + l, 2*i+2}, •••, {2*2 - 3, 2*2-2}. Each of these pairs leads to PD impr

to y(Ś). Since these are finitely many PD improvements, x(f)>y(S) by
y(l)>x(7 ), we get, x(S) ^ 7) >jc( 7) >.>>(£). Thus, x(Ś)>y(Ś) by transitivi

(b) Let x(l)>y(ī ), i.e., We drop *1 and *4,„ *4„+i for all N from T to ob

Hence SŒQ(î). Let r, = {2*,- 1, 2*, + 1,-, 2*2~3}, r2 = {2*,, 2*, +2,It ' 2*4,,+ 1 - 2: «EN}. Observe that,

(A) for all *er,, x,(l)=c>b=y,(S); for all *^r2, x,(l)=c<d=y,(S);
(B) for all *Gi, x,(l)=xl(S) = a<b=yl(T)=y,(Sh and
(C) for all the remaining coordinates, xfj) =y,(S) and xl(Ś)=y,(l).

Then for the generations 2*i - 1 and 2*4~ 1, X2,4-'(l)=a<b=y2iA-'(S)<y

>;2/4-i(iS')+^2/,-i(iS')=jc2,4-i(7)+jC2/l-i(7) or a + c=2b. There are finitely ma

infinitely many generations in T. Let the cardinality of set T 1 be K. T

6 If a? i = l, then { 1 ,* • *, 2(ti' - l)}= 0 . For illustration, for 7V={l, 2, 3, 4,-*-}, N

streams are x{N,N) = {c , c, b, d, c, c, a , o, b, b,"'} and y(N, N) = {b, d, c, c, b, d , b , b , a
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/'

generations /1 =2/4 - 1 , Ik from T such that similar inequalities

{2*i + l, /2}, {2^2 - 3, Ik). Each of these pairs leads to PD improv

Since these are finitely many PD improvements, and also by com

t^T2Uj'{l',"' Ik}, y(Ś)>x(j) by PD and M. Also, y(j)^x(Ś) by
y(S)>x(l)>y(7)^x(S). Thus, y{S)>x(S) by transitivity of and so

(c) Let x{T)^y{l), i.e., T&F. We drop *1, *2 , *3 and *4„+2, *4, ,+3
S={*4, *5, *s, Hence S^Q,(l) . Denote the set of coordinates 7"i =
r2 = {2*2, 2*2+2,-, 2/3 - 2}, r3 = {2r, - 1, 2*. + l,-, 2/2- 3} U {2/3

2/, + 2, - , 2*2-2} U {2*3, 2/3+2,-, 2*4-2}, and {2í4,+2-1,- 2
(i) For x(S) and y(l ),

(A) for all *er,, y,(T)=c>b=xl(S); for all *Gi2, yl(T)=c<d=xl
(B) for all *er, x,(S)=a<b=y,(l ); and
(C) for all the remaining coordinates, j>,(7)=jc,CS).

Then for the generations 2*2- 1 and 2 *2, X2t2-'(S) = b<c=y2

X 2/2- i(-S) +JC 2i2(S) =yii2- Afi+yitJj) or b+d=2c. Similar in

generations {2*2+1, 2*2+2}, •••,{2*3 - 3, 2*3 - 2}. Each of these pai

y{T) compared to x{S) . Since these are finitely many pairs of
comparing generations t^T, x(Ś)<y(l) by PD and M.
(ii) For x(j) and y(S ),

(A) for all *GÍ3, xt{T)=c>b=ykS' for all *Gi4, x,{T)=c<d=y
(B) for all *Gi, Xt(T)=a<b=yt{S' and
(C) for all the remaining coordinates, xtj)=yi$.

Then for the generations 2*i - 1 and 2*6- 1, a:2/6-i(Z) =a

and jc2/6-i(7)+jc2/,-i(7)=^6-iCS)+^2i,-i(S) or a+c=2b. There are fi
and infinitely many generations in T. Let the cardinality of set
/'

choose generations /1 = 2*6 - 1, /2,-, Ik from T such that similar

generations {2*i + l, /2}, - , {2*4- 3, Ik). Each of these pairs lea

compared to jc(7). Since these are finitely many pairs of PD impro

remaining generations *Gi4U Atti,'", IkÌ , y(Ś)>x(j) by PD and

Since x{Ť)^y{Ť), we gel y(S)>x(l)^y(l)>x(S). Thus, y(Ś)>x(Ś) by
□

Proof of Proposition 4. If not, then there is Y= {a, b , c, d , e }, where a<b<c<d<e , and ^ is a
representable social welfare order on X= YN satisfying the PD and M. Let W' X->K be a function which

represents ^ on X.

Let /=(0, l) and {n, r2,-} be a given enumeration of the rational numbers in I . For each real
number /?£=/, define N(p) = {n: n^= N; n> 2: r„€=(0,/?)} and M(p)=^N'{Mp) U {1,2}}. Define following pair
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of sequences x (p)€=X and y(p)^X as:

e if n = 1 , d if n = 1 ,

. , b if n - 2, . x c if « = 2,

. x
b 'in^N'p),' ' y«b)=
b . if f n^Nip),

b . if f (4)

a otherwise, a otherwise,

Note that x2(p) = b<c=y2(p)<y'(p)=d<e=x'(p) and xn(p)=yn(p) for all n>

y(p)>x(p), and W{y(p))> W{x(p)) . Now let q^(p,'). Observe that N(p)^N{q) and M(q

infinitely many elements in NÍq)C'M(p). Let j(p,q) = min {NÌq)CìM(p)} for which yj{p,
holds. Define

_'d if n - 2,
y ,,ip) otherwise,

Since Z2 = d>c=y2(p ) and z>y(p ), z^y(p) by M. Also, Zj(p,q) = a<b=Xj(p,q){q) = bz=xi{q)<d=Z2'
and Xn{q)^-Zn for all other N. This implies x(q)>z by PD and M. Combining it with z^y(p) we get
x{q)> y(p) and so W(x(q)) > W(y(p)) . This leads to a contradiction, by using the arguments in Basu and

Mitra

(2003,

Proof

of

We

the

use

Theorem

Proposition
technique

of

5.

1).

□

Define

proof

used

Y=
in

{a,

Pro

b if t^LTÕ, e if t^LTĒ,
x,= c if t^UTÕ, d if t&JĪĒ, (6)
.a if t^LČŇ, b if t^UCN.
and y(T,~Ñ'

b if t^LTO, e if t^LTE,

y<='c if t&JTO, d if t^UTĒ, (7)
a if t^LCN, b if t^UCN.
□

Proof of Proposition 6. Given any sequence x^X, define N(x) - {n' xn-a), and M(x) = {m: xm - b or

x m=c}. Let a(n)= ß(n)= - and d(n)= ~a(n) for all n^ N. We define W : X-* by

2a0z) + 2 if N(x) or Mix) is non-empty ,

n^Nix) m e M Lx)

W(

x)

=

^5(n)(x„ - g) otherwise.

-

oo

(8)

Then, it is easy to show that W( x) satisfies PD and M. □

Remark 2. Unlike in the previous cases, W does not satisfy WP. Consider y={b, b
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Then, x>y by WP, whereas W(x)= Wty) = - y.
Proof of Proposition 7. Note that Y with a= 0, b= 1, c-

ût(w)=- y-, and <5(w)= - a(n). For x^X, let Mx) = {«: x
SWF as follows.

2 «(")+ 2 a(m) i/Mx) or M(x) w non -empty,

n^N(x) mGM(x)

W(x)=
^"l5(n)Gt„- a) otherwise.

„

(9)

■n= 1

Now we show that W satisfies PD. There are three possible situations in which we can compare p
of sequences x and y using PD.
(a) For x , y£=X let there exists /, j'Œ N such that

yi=a<b=Xi<Xj=c<d=yj , and Xk-yk for all &€=N'{/,./},
then we need to show that W(x ) > Wiy). Note Mx) U i=N(y) and M( x) U j=M(y).

(i) If N(x)=M(x) = 0 , then, W(x) > 0 > W(y) since N(y) 0 and M (y) =*= 0 .
(ii) If N(x)=t= 0 or M(x)=f= 0, then:

řHx) - = 2 2 + 2 «0») - 2

/jGjVtr) «eMj'l m & Mix) tne MM

= 2 - 2 «(«)+ 2 «(m)- 2

n&Nix) n6/V(jr)U/ m^Mlx) tn&Mix)U j

= -a(/)-û-(;)=^7+^7 >
(b) For jc, let there exists /, N such that

yi=a<b=Xi<Xj=b<c=yj , and Xk=yk for all &^N'{/,./

then we need to show that W(x )>W(y). Note Mx)U/=My) and M

(i) If N(x)=M(x) = 0 , then, WU)>0> My) since My)* 0.
(ii) If Mx) ^0 or M(x) =*= 0 , then:

ww - ww = 2 - 2 »(«)
«e Mx) «e Mv)

=2
«(w)- 2 - ffO)=T7 > o.
«e Mx) n ^ Nix) U i ¿
(c) For x , let there exists /, such that

y¡=b<c=Xi<>Xj=c<d=yj , and Xk=yk for all Ar^N'{/j},
then we need to show that W(x)>tV(y)- Note N(x)=N(y) and M(x)U j=M(y).
(i) If Mx) = M Cc) = 0 , then, W(x) > 0 > řF(y) since M (y) =*= 0 .

This content downloaded from
108.5.56.136 on Tue, 24 May 2022 15:28:41 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

2016] A NOTE ON SOCIAL WELFARE ORDERS SATISFYING PIGOU-DALTON TRANSFER PRINCIPLE 257

(ii) If N(pc)=f= 0 or Mix)^ 0, then:

Wbc )-W(y)= 2 cfon)- 2 «(»i)
Mix) m^Miy)

=
aim)2 a(m)=
-a(j)=^j ^
w 2
e Mv)
w e Mír)
U; ^
□
Remark 3. It is easy to see that the SWF violates M, as it should. Consider x={b, b,-~} and y=ld, d,-'}.

Then Wty)= - 1 and W{x) - b - a> 0. Thus W{x)>W(y) whereas y^x by M.
Proof of Proposition 8. Define Y={a, b , c, d , e} with a<b<c<d<e , <z + c = 26, b+d=2c , and c + e = 2¿

. Let 7V={«,, »2, «3, «4,'"} be an infinite subset of N such that «»<«<+ 1 for all Let
Ař={l, 2,-", 2(«4 - l)}. For any T^Q(Ñ), T={t', ti, ti, ti,---} with tk<tk+¡ for all we partition the

set of natural numbers N in U={2t' - 1, 2t',---, 2(/2- l), 2t}~ I,--, 2(í4- l),-"} and ¿=N'ř/=
{l,2,-,2(ři-l),2ř2-l,2/2,- ,2(/3-1),-}. Let ŪTĒ={t<^LC'N: /is even} and LTÕ= LClŇ'LŤĚ . Also,
ŪTĒ={t<EUr'N: /is even} and ŪĪ0=UP'N'fJTĒ . Further, LCTE={t<EL'Ñ: t is even}, LCTO=
{L'Ñ}'LCTE, UCTE={t<EU'Ñ: t is even}, U CTO = { U'Ñ} 'UCTE. The utility stream x(T,Ñ) is,

b if t^LTÕ, d if téLŤĚ,
c if /eZ/ro, c if t<EŪ tè,
X,=-

a if t^LCTO, e if t^LCTE,
b if t^UCTO, d if t^UCTE.

The utility assigned to odd and even generations in LC'N are b, and d, respectivel

assigned to each generation in UC'N is c. Similarly the utility assigned to odd and even

ISN are a, and e respectively. Lastly the utility assigned to odd and even generations in U
respectively.

The utility stream y(T, ,V) is defined using the subset A)' il in place of subset l', in identical fashion.
The two partitions of the set of natural numbers N are t/= {2ř2 - 1 , 2/2,'", 2 (r¡ 1), 2/4 - 1, - ,2(/5 - l), - }

and £=N'[/. Let LTE={t^LC'Ñ: řiseven} and LTÓ=LC'Ñ'L7E . Also, UTE={t^UC'N: tis even}

and UTÕ=ur'JhUTE . Further, LCTE={t^L'Ñ: t is even}, L&Õ={l'n}'lCTÈ, UCTE= {t^lf'
Ñ: t is even}, TjCW = { U'Ñ} 'UCTĒ. The utility stream y(T,~Ñ) is,7

b if t^LTÔ, d if t^LTÈ,
c if t&JTÕ, c if t^UTE,
y,=-

a if t^LCTO, e if t^LCTE,

.b if t^áJcrÕ, d if t^UCTĒ.

7 If n' = 1, then { 1 2{n' - l)}= 0. For illustration, for N={ 1, 2, 3, 4,--}, N={', 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} a
streams are x{N, N) = {c, c, by d , c, c, a, e, b , d' and y(N, N) = {b, d, c , c, b, d, c, c, a, e , b, d--'}.
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As N is unique for any N, x(S , Ń) and y(S , N) are wel

Let ^ be. a social welfare order satisfying PD. We claim that the collection of sets
r={jV^Q: y(Ń)>x(Ń}} is non-Ramsey. We need to show that for each the collection £2(7)
intersects both T and Q'r. For this, it is sufficient to show that for each 7^Q, there exists S€EQ(7) such

that either or S^F, with the either/or being exclusive. Let T={t i, In the remaining proof we
are concerned with infinite utility sequences x(Ty 7), y(ī , l) and x(S , 7), y(S , l) where 5^fì(7). For ease
of notation, we omit reference to T. As the binary relation is complete, one of the following cases must

arise: (a) y(l)>x(l); (b) x(l)>y(l); (c) x(l)^-y(l). Accordingly, we now separate our analysis into three
cases.

(a) Let y(l)>x(l); that is, 77^r. We drop t' from T to obtain S={/2, /

T' = {2t' - ', 2/i + l,**#, Iti - 3} and 7^ - (2/i, 2/i +2,- * *, 2/2 - 2}. Observe t

(A) for all t^Tu xt(l)=c>b=yt(S);
(B) for all ¿er2, x,(l)=c<d=yl(S );
(C) for all the remaining /^ N, x,(T)-y,(S).

(D) for all /GN, Xl(S)=yt(T)
Then for the generations 2/i - 1 and 2t',

y2n-'{S) = b<c=X2h-'{rl)<X2tfj)=1c<d-y2n{S), and b+d=2c.

Similar inequalities hold for the pair of generations {2/i + l, 2/i + 2}, •

these pairs leads to PD improvements in x(l) compared to j>CS). Since t

improvements, x(l)>y{Ś) by PD. Also, x(Ś)^y(j). Since y(l)>x(l), we get

x(S)-y(l)>x(T)>y(S).
Thus, x(Ś)>y(Ś) by transitivity of and so S&F.

(b) Let x(l)>y(l ); that is, We drop t' and minimum number of /4„, /4„+

|{2/,-l,-, 2/2-2}|£|{2í4-l,-, 2í5-2}U-U{2í4*-1,-, 2uk+~2}'

from T to obtain S={t2, /3, /6, ti, t io, /n,* * •} . Hence Svilii) . Denote the set of coordinate

{2fi-l, 2/1 + 1,-, 2*2-3} by Tu {2/i, 2/i + 2,-, 2/2-2} by T2 , {2/4-l, 2/4+l,- , 2/5-3,- ,
2t 4A 1 , * * * , 2^+1 - 3} by r3 and {2/4, 2/4+2,---, 2/5 - 2,-", 2 /«,••*, 2/4*+i- 2} by 7Y

(i) For x(l) and y(S ),

(A)
(B)
(C)
(D)

for all /er,, Xt(j)=c>b=y,(S );
for all /er3, xt(l)=a<b=y,(S);
for all /GÍ2, x,(T)=c<d=y,(S );
for all /Gi4, x,(l)=e>d=yl(S );

(E) for all the remaining coordinates, x,(l)=y,(Ś).
Following cases arise.
(I) For the generations 2/i - 1 and 2/4 - 1,

X2U-'(l)-a<b=y2l4-'(Ś)<>y2h-'(Ś)=b<c=X2,[-'(7)i and a+c=2b.
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Similar inequalities hold for the pair of generations {2/i + 1, 2/4 + l}, ••*, {2ř2 - 3, m } where
m^Tļ.

(II) For the generations 2t' and 2/4,

X2li(l)=c<d=y2h(S)<ym(Ś)=d<e=X2l4(7), and c+e=2d.

Similar inequalities hold for the pair of generations {2/i + 2, 2/4 + 2}, •••, {2/2 where m +1=171 Gí4.

(III) For the generations m +1, m +2, and remaining generations8 in T3U r4,

Xm+'(T)=a<b=ym +'(S)<ym +2(S)=d<e=Xm +2(1), and a + e=b+d.
Each of these instances leads to PD improvements in y(S) compared to jc(7) and there are finitely

many of them. Hence, y(Ś)>x(l) by PD.
(ii) For jc(S) and y(l)

(A) for all t^Thx,(S) = a<b=y,(Sh
(B) for all /er4, x,(Ś) = e >d=y,(l);
(C) for all the remaining coordinates, y,(7)=xl{Ś).

The case of generations in r3 and Tą is similar to (b)(i)(III) above. Since these are finitely many

PD improvements, y{l)>x(Ś) by PD. Since x(7)>}>(7), we get

yCS) >x(7) >y(l) >x(S).
Thus, y(S)>x(S) by transitivity of and so
(c) Let x(7 )^y(ī); that is, We drop /1, t2 , /3, and minimum number of /4„+2, /4„+3 such that

|{2/,-l,-, 2/2- 2}U{2/3- 1,"", 2/4- 2} I < I {2ř6 - I,***, 2/7-2}U-U{2/4*+2-l,-, 2/4*+3-2}|
from T to obtain S={/4, /5, ti, 1 9, "'i. Hence S^Q(7). Denote the set of coordinates {2t2~ l,2/2 +

1,-, 2/3-3} by Tu {2/2, 2/2+2, •••, 2/3-2} by T2, {2/,- 1, 2/,+ 1,-, 2/2 - 3} U {2/3- 1, 2/3 + 1,-,

2/4-3} by Th {2/,, 2/1+2,-, 2/2-2}U{2/3, 2/3 + 2,-, 2/4-2} by r4, {2u~ 1, 2/6+ 1-, 2/7-3,-,
2í4k+2~ 1,"', 2/4^+3 - 3} by Ti, and {2/6,*", 2/7 - 2,***, 2/4*+2,"', 2/4*+3 2} by 72.

(i) For x(S) and >>(7),

(A) for all /£=Ti, y,(l)=c>b=x,(S);
(B) for all /£i2, y,(l)=c<d=x,(S);

(C) for all /Gr,, xt{$=a<b=y,(j)'
(D) for all /GÍ2, x,{Ś) = e> d=y,{ ī);
(E) for all the remaining coordinates, y,(7)=x,(S).
/'

/'

For

T

above.

(a)
8

1,

T2,

Also

above.

The

PD

for

T

Since

number

of

improvements
1,

T2

these

these

,

PD

are

finite

generations
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(ii) For x(Ť) and yiS),

(A) for all x,(l)=c>b=y,(S)'9
(B) for all /er,, xfj) =a<b =y,(Ś);

(C) for all xfj)=c<d=y,{S)'
(D) for all /GÍ2, x,(l)=e>d=y,(S );
(E) for all the remaining coordinates, yl(Ś)=x,(j).

Here, PD improvements in y(l) compared to x{Ś) can be shown following the case (b)(i) above.
Since these are finitely many instances of PD improvements, y(S)>x(j) by PD.

Since x(l)^-yil), we get

y(Ś) >x(f) ^y(r) >x(S)
Thus, y(Ś)>x(S) by transitivity of and so S^V.
□
Proof of Proposition 9. Note that Y with a= 1, b = 2, c= 6, d=7 , e= 11, and /= 12 satisfies all conditions

of the proposition. Let N(x) = {n: x„=a or x„=fi, and M(x) = {n: x„=b or x»=e} . Let a(n)=-^,
ßin) = - and ô(n)=-a(n) for all «EN. We define the SWF as follows.

2a(/i) + 2 3 W if Mx) or M(x) is non-empty,

nGN(x) m<EM(x)

Wix)=

2

■n=

We

1

»

(12)

5(n)

show

y¡<Xi<X}<yj

Cf»

that
,

W

>>,+>>;

PD transfers.

(a) yi=a<b=Xi<c=Xj<d=yj . Both Mx) and N(y) are non-empty in this case and M(pc)=M(y) .
Therefore, řKx) - Jity) = /?(*) - ctii) = - Jy + ^7 > 0.

(b) yi=a<c=Xi^c=Xj<e=yj. Then, My)^0. If Mx) or Mix) is non-empty, then Wix)-My)=
-a(i)-ß(j)>0. If both Nix) and M(x) are empty sets, then Wix) > 0 > W(y).

(c) yi=a<c=xi<d=zxj<f=yj . Then, My )=f=0 . If Mx) or M( x) is non-empty, then Mx)~My) =
-a(i)-a(j)> 0. If both Mx) and M(x) are empty sets, then W(x)>0>W{y).

(d) y¡=b<c=Xi<d=Xj<e=yj . Then, M(y)=f=0 . If Mx) or M(x) is non-empty, then Mx) - My) =
-ß(i)-ß(j)>0. If both Mx) and M(x) are empty sets, then *Hx)>0> W(y).

(e) yi=b<d=Xi<,d=Xj<f=yj . Then, My)z*=0 and M(y)=tz0 . If Mx) or Af(x) is non-empty, then
W(x)-W(y)=-ß(i)-a(j)> 0. If both Mx) and M(x) are empty sets, then Mx) > 0 > My).

(f ) yi=c<d=Xi<e=Xj<f=yj . Both Mix) and Miy) are non-empty in this case and Nix)=My) .
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Therefore, Wix)-Wiy)=ß{j)-a(J) = -^-'-^]>0.
□
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